From Nassim Taleb's Black Swans to Black Mambas: Scenarios on the Emergence and Development of Pandemics

The Shona language / ChiShona is predominantly spoken in some parts of South Eastern Africa. According to linguists, the language has what they refer to as a 'holophrastic structure'. In the Shona language, inflections of words express enough attendant circumstances to incorporate into one word what, in Indo-European languages, would require complete sentences.

For instance, in ChiShona the phrase "We are going there" can be expressed in a single twelve letter word like "tirikuendako". Another interesting word is "Rovambira" / "Rova-Mbira", which, as Illustration 1 below shows, can have two broad meanings:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 1 shows, the word Rovambira can have either of two meanings:

1. An expert at playing the "mbira" or African xylophone. (this is a very loose translation) [3]
2. A snake that bludgeons rock rabbits / rock hyraxes, i.e. a black mamba.

Unlike other serpents, the black mamba is very aggressive; in the rural areas of Africa you will hear tales of the snake "standing" upright on its tail to chase humans. You'll also hear stories of how the snake displays the black interior of its mouth to compel a herd of buffalo to clear its path.

If my memory serves me right, I last saw a black mamba in captivity around 14 years ago. I remember it being a thin, grey, very long snake with a coffin shaped head. I also remember how it was almost motionless in its shatter-proof enclosure, and, how it was difficult for me to reconcile the serpent's seemingly docile nature with the florid tales of aggression that the snake keeper narrated.

Sometime last week, I had a discussion on the topic of risk management with a successful businessman/hunter/environmentalist/conservationist. He used a riveting metaphor of a black mamba's hunting strategy to explain certain blind spots in risk management. I will narrate an abbreviated version of his metaphor below:


...The Miserable Fate of the Young Hyrax

In the Eastern highlands of Zimbabwe, temperatures sometimes drop, at night, to around three degrees Celsius. If you hike up the mountains at dawn (especially the mountains with rocky outcrops in their valleys) you may be "lucky" enough to find a black mamba coiled-up on a flat granite boulder; basking in the sun alongside ten to twenty rock rabbits / rock hyraxes (hyraxes have incomplete thermo-regulation; they use the sun's rays to warm up their bodies). For hours, the serpent lies motionless; seemingly oblivious of the 'nutritious activity' occurring within a short radius from its 'tanning bed'.

As the herd basks, rock-rabbit-sentries perch-up on high vantage points; where they scan the horizon for predators like jackals, eagles, wild dogs, and hawks. Illustration 2 below depicts such a scenario:

Illustration 2 (click on illustration to zoom in)

When there is a predator, like an eagle, on the horizon, the sentries belch-out an alarm call that prompts the entire herd to make a dash for burrows within rock crevices. In the midst of this tumult, the black mamba arises from its ostensible slumber and repeatedly strikes, with immense grace and briskness, up to six (or maybe seven) members of the fleeing herd.

As you may know, the black mamba's venom is made up of powerful neurotoxins that immobilize the stricken victims within a fifteen to thirty second timeframe. Generally, the stricken victims tend to be the younger members of the herd, or, the slower-older members of the herd.

Usually, the snake consumes two or three of the smaller victims (or one large victim if there are no smaller ones) and leaves the remainder (for scavenging white-necked crows to dispose. The snake may also strike the crows if they are too hasty.)

The miserable fate of the departed herd members can be summed-up in Illustration 3 as follows:

Illustration 3 (click on illustration to zoom in)

What the metaphor demonstrates: we tend to focus on the risks that lie on distant horizon, sometimes, to the detriment of greater more proximate risks. Further, when the proximate risk factors spawn undesirable events, we tend to err by linking the undesirable events to the distant risk factors that we were fixated upon.


...The 8th Edition of the World Economic Forum's Risk Report

Yesterday, I spent a small chunk of my time skimming through the current edition of the World Economic Forum's Risk Report. I focused on identifying the relationships, and, the first and second-order consequences of the risk factors in Illustration 4:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in) Source: WEF Risk Report

Illustration 5 expositions the inter-linkages, first and second-order consequences that I identified:

Illustration 5 (click on illustration to zoom in) [1]

In this blog post, I will use scenarios to add contextual dimensions to the risk factors in Illustration 5, and, to demonstrate the linkages between the risk factors. My objective is to show how garden variety activities may advance these risks. And, how it is easy to underestimate them (i.e. the risk factors are more of "black mambas" and less of "eagles").

***

...Frontiers with Unknown Viruses

"If an intelligent extra-terrestrial was tasked with writing the encyclopaedia of life on this planet, twenty seven out of thirty of these volumes would be devoted to bacteria and viruses. With just a few of the volumes left for plants, fungi and animals, and, humans would just be a foot note... an interesting footnote... but a footnote nonetheless."

 –  Nathan Wolfe, Virologist

Where do most of the unknown viruses live? Answer:

1. Oceans.
2. Forests (particularly rainforests).

 Illustration 6 below depicts the world's forest cover:

Illustration 6 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 6 demonstrates, the African forest cover, that lies between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, is relatively under-exploited or "untouched". Therefore, it is reasonable for one to argue that most of the unknown viruses that will be discovered in the near future will emerge from African equatorial rainforests. Hence, the scenarios that would be narrated in this post will have their settings in equatorial Africa.

Illustration 7 below expositions some of the scenarios that would be explored in this post:

Illustration 7 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Generally, the black scenarios are the most probable ones and the green ones, are ceteris paribus, the least probable scenarios. In this post, I will only narrate the most probable scenarios, i.e. the black mambas.

***

A scenario is basically a story about what happened in the future. Illustration 8 depicts the dimensions of the scenarios that will be narrated:

Illustration 8 (click illustration to zoom in)

 And so, the story telling begins [2]:

...The Bushmeat Hunter Scenario

Pierre Boma (fictional name) is a twenty six year-old father of five children. He lives in a small village that is located on the southern-most fringes of the Ituri rainforest in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Until about two months ago, he worked as a general hand at a Chinese lumber company. The firm was forced to shut down by rogue Congolese soldiers (owing to late payment of "taxes").

Unfortunately, the company owed Pierre about two months'-worth of wages when it shut down. Because of this, he is chronically short of money and cannot afford to purchase the bare essentials. To make matters worse, the crop of cassava that he grew on the wetland plot that the Mwami / Chief gave him (when Pierre got married) failed because of the torrential rains.

Further, the six 50 kg bags of soy meal, that Pierre got from the Belgian aid organization that visits quarterly, were collected by the Mwami and sent to the rebels in the jungle. Had the Mwami not done this, the rebels would have certainly: 1) sacked the village; 2) publicly raped everyone (male/female) in sight; 3) buried all the village elders alive; 4) crushed the skulls of all the infants; 5) abducted the young girls (for use as sex slaves); 6) forcibly recruited the young boys, and; 7) enslaved the men (for use as free labour in mines).

The only stable source of income that the Boma family has is the USD 2.50 per day that Pierre's wife, Carolina, earns from her evening "shift work" at the UN peace keeper base (that is 20 km from the village). Carolina, a buxom woman with a musical voice, never explains exactly what she does at the base; she just brings the money home at the end of every evening. Sometimes, she brings back blankets and provisions that are emblazoned with the UN logo. The blue berets are kind enough to pick-up and drop-off Carolina and other young women who "work" at the base every evening.

To sustain his family, Pierre hunts small game in the dense part of the rainforest that the rebels avoid. With his younger brother Patrice, he sets snares and traps in the undergrowth. On lucky days, they find pythons or small antelopes in the traps. 

The brothers also use homemade bows and arrows to shoot down any monkeys and gorillas that they spot on their way in and out of the rainforest. It is this meat that their families subsist on and sell (if there is any surplus).

Just yesterday, Pierre's right hand was cut when he was setting the snares. As he heads out to check his snares and traps, he notices that the cut is bleeding intermittently. Unfortunately, when he gets to the hunting grounds, he finds nothing in the snares. However, he does manage to shoot down two small monkeys and one young gorilla. When he lifts up the gorilla it bleeds profusely, see Illustration 9, and some of its blood seeps into his unprotected wound:

Illustration 9 (Adapted From: Wolfe's TED Talk)

What he doesn't know: The blood that seeped into his wound was contaminated with a mutated zoonotic  virus that will infect and kill him; his entire village, 95% of the rebels, 40% of the UN peace keepers and 200,000 people in the surrounding African countries (within the next 6 months). 

Simply stated, Pierre, is what virologists term "patient zero" in an outbreak of a deadly pandemic that wipes-out entire communities.

...The Rebels in the Jungle Scenario

The Wizzi rebel group (fictitious name) is made up of young men from the marginalized Wizzi tribe (fictitious name). Like some rebel groups in the region, the group took up arms to pressure the government into returning the land that was unlawfully taken from the Wizzi.

Since August, the rebel group has been roaming in the Western fringes of the Ituri rain forest. The sanctions that the UN slapped on its foreign backers reduced their willingness to support it. Thus, to sustain its activities, it  has had to resort to "preying" upon the surrounding communities. Naturally, these acts of pillage have spawned a strong anti-Wizzi tribe sentiment in the Ituri region.

Yesterday, the armed drones that were deployed by the African Union, in a well-orchestrated night time aerial raid, decimated the ranks of this rebel group. Remnants of this group are now hiding in a cave that is located in a limestone-rich pocket of the rainforest.

The wounded commander, Kenneth Goga (fictitious name), rises up to address the surviving members of his company (who are huddled around a lamp). "Gentlemen, it looks like the only way out of this quagmire is dialogue. The African Union..." Before he gets the opportunity to finish this statement, a bat appears from the middle of nowhere and bites him on his forehead. He grabs it with his bare hands, dislocates its neck and continues to deliver his speech.

What he doesn't know: The bat was infected with a lethal mutant virus that will infect him and all the delegates who will attend the African Union-mediated peace talks (that will occur in three days' time). The Rhabdovirus will induce Ebola-like symptoms in the affected people, and, it will have a mortality rate of 80%!

...The Research Scientist Scenario

Dr. Fionne von Trexlar (fictitious name) is a 31 year-old scion of an old European banking dynasty. Not only does she have movie star looks, she is also an over-achiever who excels at everything she ever does. At 16, she was part of the four-by-one-hundred Belgian women's track team that won a gold medal and set an Olympic record. When she participated in the Olympics, she had already published 15 papers in leading Zoology journals.

With a team of some of the best and brightest software engineers in Silicon Valley, she developed an algorithm that could translate, into complete English sentences, the grunts and gestures of bonobos. She spent three months testing the technology at a gorilla conservancy in Cameroon. 

While she waits backstage for the TEDx host to introduce her, Fionne's mind drifts back to the conservancy in Cameroon. She gets goosebumps as she remembers how, Gogo, the matriarch of the lesbian bonobo sisterhood that she was studying, welcomed the frail primates (that Fionne had rescued when a patch of forest was being cleared for use as a plantation). She feels a bit feverish and suspects that it's just the nerves. However, this doesn't deter her from delivering a TEDx talk that receives a standing ovation. 

At the end of the talk, multiple members of the audience congratulate her on the ground-breaking research. She locks into animated and engaging conversations with all the people who approach her. And, she looks forward to following-up on all the connections that she establishes. 

When she gets home, she feels weak and the hot-cold flashes intensify. As she keys the details of each new contact into her Google contact list, she starts to feel dizzy and she collapses.

Luckily, her wealthy hedge fund manager boyfriend, Diego, walks into her home office just after she collapses and calls the paramedics. That very evening Fionne passes away.

She is the first of 200,000 New Yorkers who will die after catching what virologists will term Bubonic Plague on Steroids.

***

Beware of black mambas!


[1] Viruses also attack bacteria. This forces the bacteria to mutate into what may very well be drug resistant super-bugs.
[2] The reader should use his or her own judgement to discern the facts (yes there are factual parts) from the fiction.
[3] The actual word is "gwenyambira". When used in a sentence like "gwenyambira ano-rovambira", the word assumes the loose meaning that I have stated.

Reframing the De-Risking Africa debate

 "When thoughtful people disagree, you get the opportunity to learn a lot"

– Ray Dalio

I've had the opportunity to re-watch the video that captures the key proceedings of the "De-Risking Africa" event that was hosted by CNBC Africa (at the just ended World Economic Forum). Surprisingly, my thoughts, when I watched the recorded footage of the debate, were different to the thoughts that raced through my mind as I watched the live screening of the debate.

When I watched the debate live, I felt that:

1. It was too short to cover the crucial issues. I felt that it would be prudent for CNBC Africa to host follow-up events to discuss all the facets of this very pertinent topic.
2. It moved, expeditiously, to issues of skewed risk-perception before the fundamentals were exhausted. And, I also felt that everything else was overshadowed once the discussion touched upon the emotive issue of risk-perception.

However, when I watched the video this time around, I felt that all key facets of this topic were reasonably covered. And... that with more time, they would have been exhausted completely.

In both instances, I was of the opinion that the moderator did a great job; the panellists were engaging, and; the discussion was spirited, optimistic (to a fault) and insightful; it definitely elevated my thinking. The event also motivated me to reflect on the topic of "De-risking Africa".

In this post, I will share the end-products of this reflective endeavour.

***

When I reflected on the topic of "De-risking Africa", I aimed to drill deeper than the surface issues; I desired to further explore the hidden dimensions of the issues that the panellists broached. The breadth of the topic made it difficult to tackle it head-on, so I broke it down into manageable chunks as Illustration 1 shows:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Illustration 1 shows that I employed the following three questions to scope the coverage of the topic: What is Risk? Which Risks are Prevalent in Africa? Which of these Risks can be managed?

The questions will each be briefly discussed below:


...What is Risk?

Illustration 2, below, is a quantitative definition of risk:

Illustration 2 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 2, shows there are two components to risk; the probability of a negative event occurring and the expected loss from the event. Therefore, the term "de-risking" implies reducing or removing risk by doing either of the following:

1. Reducing or eliminating the probability of the occurrence of a negative event, or;
2. Reducing or eliminating the expected loss from a negative event, or;
3. Doing both 1) and 2)

If you take a risk like "losses that stem from social unrest", governments and state agents have control over the probability of the negative event occurring; they can mitigate it by instituting policies that create employment. Whereas, private sector players can mitigate the expected losses from such an event by diversifying their investments across disparate countries and by using financial instruments to hedge their exposures. 

This serves to show that, in any discussion of "de-risking", it is of paramount importance to clearly establish which stakeholder contingent can reduce which element of risk (refer back to Illustration 2 for the elements of risk).

***

...Which Risks are Prevalent in Africa?

To answer this question, I scanned through the archives of the World Economic Forum's publications. And, I found an article which is titled Africa Faces Numerous Risks. Illustration 3 expositions the risks that, according to the article, are prevalent in Africa:

Illustration 3 (click on illustration to zoom in)

According to Illustration 3, the risks that are prevalent in Africa are: Geopolitical Instability, Climate Change. Food and Water Security Issues, and Economic Shocks.

All of these risks are interrelated in one way or another as Illustration 4 shows:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Illustration 4 expositions seven chains of causation, including:

• Climate change → Economic Shocks (e.g. two to three years ago, climate change-induced drought affected Kenya’s horticultural industry and curtailed the nation's ability to generate sufficient hydrological electricity).
• Climate Change → Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability (this chain tends to manifest itself in agrarian economies).
• Climate Change → Food and Water Security Issues → Economic Shocks.
• Climate Change → Food and Water Security Issues  → Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability.
• Geopolitical Instability → Economic Shocks (e.g. Kenya and Zimbabwe’s tourism industries after the countries' violent elections in 2009).
• Geopolitical Instability → Food and Water Security Issues (e.g. Darfur and Somalia during conflict times).
• Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability (e.g. Falling coffee prices were cited as a cause of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda).

From these chains of causation, the following is evident:

1. Climate change is the root cause of most Economic Shocks and Food and Water Security Issues in Africa. As emissions negotiations demonstrate time and time again, it would be very difficult to minimize the probability of the occurrence of catastrophic climate change by reducing emissions. Hence, to mitigate the climate change risk, African stakeholders should focus their attention on the "reducing the expected loss from the events" lever in Illustration 2.
2. That similar chains of causation (e.g. Climate change → Economic Shocks, and, Climate Change → Economic Shocks → Geopolitical Instability) spawn different end-risks. Put more clearly: Geopolitical Instability arises (from a set of similar factors) in some instances and not others. This begs the question of why. The easy answer to this question is: Coordination Public Goods (i.e. Free Speech, Free Press and Freedom of Assembly, Free and Fair Elections e.t.c.) are responsible for this difference; they mitigate the risk of geopolitical instability. However, it is important for this link to be demonstrated empirically in new studies, and, it is also important to explore the other factors that play a role in mitigating geopolitical instability.

Africa has come a long way, and for the 5-6% growth rate to be sustained, it is important for stakeholders to have more solution-focused "De-risking Africa"-type debates.

By solution focused debates I mean debates that discuss how to: 1) eliminate the probability of key negative events, and; 2) mitigate the losses that would stem from the-said events. Further, it is also important to give Climate Change the lion's share of the time in such discussions (refer back to Illustration 4), because it is the root cause of most risks in Africa.

The Congo: Rwanda's Ancient Boarders, the DRC's 'Secret History' and Creating Lasting Peace

"Idealists who are not well-grounded in reality create problems, not progress."

– Ray Dalio

There are numerous competing narratives on the origins of the turmoil in the Congo. None of them is entirely precise or factually bankrupt per se; they all contain elements of truth that deserve equal appreciation [1]. Otherwise put; they are part of a coherent whole that has to be fully comprehended before anyone formulates solutions to the Congo issue.

Interestingly enough, all narratives on the origins of the crisis in the Congo stem from three main perspectives or lenses, as Illustration 1 below shows:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

The lenses can be briefly described as follows:

• The International Human Rights Organization Lens: The main architects of this lens are The Congolese Diaspora, the Francophone Rwandan diaspora and non-profit organizations that have the following mandates; Promotion of Human Rights, Disaster Relief, Poverty Reduction and Human Development. In their work in the Congo, NGOs encounter horrendous atrocities that are committed by state and non-state agents and players. Some of these organizations research, document and bring the-said atrocities to the attention of the world (this is done with the explicit aim of jolting the international community into solution mode). Currently, the international human rights organization lens is focused on the M23 mutiny, particularly its link to the government of Rwanda.
• The pro-Rwanda Lobby Lens: The main architects of this lens are The Government of Rwanda, Aid Organizations that work in Rwanda, Allies and Associates of the Rwandan elites, Diplomats, the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora and some Development Economists. They are impressed by: the post-genocide progress of the Rwandan economy; her progress in the human development arena, and; the efficacy of the country's aid utilization. They are staunch supporters of the regime that currently administers Rwanda, and, they are currently focused on insulating the Rwandan regime from the diplomatic backlash that was triggered by the revelations of the Group of Experts on the Congo. It would be naive to make broad generalizations about what the interests of the architects of this lens are. However, it is safe to assert that a certain subset of this group seeks to champion the rights of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
• The Multitudinous Rebel Group Lens: The main architects of this lens are rebel groups that roam(ed) the rainforests of the Congo like the AFDL, ALEC, ALiR, AMP, Remnants of the CNDP, FARDC, FDC, FDLR, FCLC, FRF, LRA, MRPC, NDC, ADCLS, FRPI, FDLR, M23, Nyatura, Sheka, Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba, Raia Mutomboki and UPCP. Some are "community self-help" groups that have legitimate grievances that they would like the Congolese government to address; others are remnants of foreign military outfits that seek to use the Congo as a launch-hub for attacks on other nations; while others could be characterised as scavengers. Alliances are always being forged and broken, sometimes violently, by members of these rebel groups. Thus, it is difficult to make broad generations about their points of view. Further, most of these rebel groups are inept at public relations, and, they are generally marginalized by the research community and the international media because of (logistical constraints and) the fear of legitimizing the rebel groups' respective positions.

By and large, the architects of each lens zealously discount the assertions that are made by the architects of other lenses; regardless of whether there is a modicum of truth in them or not. Otherwise put, their battles to define the popular narrative of the Congo Issue obfuscate its elements. And, this inhibits the formulation of solutions that would create lasting peace and prosperity for the Congolese people.

In this post, I will attempt to amalgamate the competing lenses to produce a holistic snapshot of the Congo issue.

I will start by discussing Rwanda's ancient boarders and the history of the Banyamulenge in the Congo. Secondly, I will discuss the evolution of hostilities towards the Kinyarwanda-speaking people, and, how they were shaped by politicians and the activities of Rwanda-sponsored forces in the Congo. Lastly, I will demonstrate how these hostilities will make it difficult for the Kabila government to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge / Banyarwanda / Kinyarwanda-speaking people.

***

"To remain ignorant of things that happened before you were born is to remain a child."

 – Cicero

"History is the witness that testifies to the passing of time; it illumines reality, vitalizes memory, provides guidance in daily life and brings us tidings of antiquity"

 – Cicero

 
Between 1880 and 1895, a Rwandan Chief, or Mwami, called Rabugiri established a unified state with a centralised military structure. As Illustration 2, below, shows, the Rwandan nation that Rabugiri founded overspills into the modern-day territory of Tanzania and the DRC:

Illustration 2 Adapted from: Exploring Africa

Illustration 2 clearly shows that the Old Rwandan kingdom spilled over into the outermost fringes of what is now known as North and South Kivu. In South Kivu, the Old Rwandan kingdom intersected with the Luba kingdom. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that the sliver of territory that is annotated "This Land" in Illustration 2 is the segment of the modern-day Congo that can (uncontestably) be regarded as part of the Old Rwandan kingdom.

 

In a protest letter that was penned by a Group of Scholars (on Eastern Congo) to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, they stated that "the origins of the problem" (i.e. Marginalization of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the DRC) lay in the "Berlin Conference [where some] Rwandan territories became Congolese". They also recommended for the UN Secretary General to investigate the "pillage" of the Congo by "foreign firms". Interestingly, this letter was quoted and referenced heavily in the Rwandan media (which is state controlled). 

Hence, this indicates that the Rwandan elites endorse its contents; they are unhappy about the marginalization of Kinyarwanda-speaking people in the Congo, and, they are unhappy about the "pillage of the Congo by foreign firms". 

In the latter parts of this post, I will indicate how these two points and the historical boundaries of Rwanda can be used to disincentivize the Rwandan government from sponsoring rebel groups.

***

...How did the Kinyarwanda-speaking people come to settle in the Congo?

Illustration 3, below, answers the question that is in the heading of this section:

Illustration 3 (download for a better view)

As Illustration 3 shows, Banyarwanda migration to the DRC was largely push migration; it was generally forced. It occurred during the following time-periods:

• 1880 to 1895: A small contingent of Banyarwanda (both Tutsi and Hutu) fled to South Kivu in the Congo, after Mwami Rabugiri - the unifier chief that I mentioned in the opening paragraphs, instituted onerous taxes. In the late 1920s, the Tutsi from this contingent were allowed, by the Congo colonial authorities, to occupy a high plateau farther south.
• 1924 to 1929: Over 7,000 Banyarwanda, i.e. Tutsi and Hutu, arrived in South Kivu in the Congo in search of work.
• 1959 to 1960: An Influx of Tutsi refugees arrived in South Kivu in the Congo. It had fled the "Social Revolution" in Rwanda that was led by Grégoire Kayibanda.
• 1971 to 1973: Anti-Hutu massacres occurred in Burundi and revenge anti-Tutsi persecutions occurred in Rwanda. Owing to this, a contingent of Rwandan Tutsi refugees joined the pastoral Tutsi in South Kivu.

In the 1970s, Mobutu Sese Seko's Citizenship Act "compelled" the Banyarwanda to convert their collective name to Banyamulenge. Around this time, the Banyarwanda in South Kivu started to increasingly refer to themselves as the Banya-Tulambo and the Banya-Minembwe, i.e. they named themselves after their "home regions", Tulambo and Minembwe. [5]

In the latter parts of this post, I will return to this point.

***

...Major Incidents of Persecution

The major incidents of Tutsi persecution that transpired in the Congo can be abbreviated as follows:

• 1970s to 1980s: The Congo Citizenship Act of 1971, which was instituted by the Mobutu government, "compelled" the Tutsi to convert their collective identity from Banyarwanda to Banyamulenge; which loosely translates to "People of Mulenge". Naturally, this created tensions between the Tutsi and the Bafuliro people, who were the original inhabitants of Mulenge. 
• I981: The Nande and Hunde people from North Kivu, i.e. a region in which Tutsi migrants had settled, launched a campaign to strip-away the citizenship of Tutsi that descended from post-1885 migrants from Rwanda.
• 1985: The "Indigenous" Kivutian majority, i.e. the Nande and Hunde elites, instituted reforms that would restrict Banyarwanda from holding political office.
• 1993: Bloody conflicts occurred between the Tutsi, Hutu and indigenous populations of the Kivu region. To contain the violence, the Mobutu government sent poorly equipped and corrupt troops. The troops appeared to support the Banyarwanda -- which further aggravated the tensions between them and the other inhabitants of the Kivus.
• 1993 to 1994: Tensions between the Hutu genocidiares, who had fled into the DRC, and the Tutsi inhabitants of the Kivus started rising.
• 1994 to 1996: In 1995, Anzuluni Mbembe, the co-speaker of the Parliament of Congo, signed a resolution which stated that all "recent" Banyamulenge refugees would be expelled from the Congo. In addition to this, he compiled a list of "other" Banyamulenge who would be expelled from the country. In 1996, all Banyamulenge who did not obey the-said decree had their property expropriated, and, they were shepherded into refugee camps. In response to this injustice, Banyamulenge militia coalesced to fight the Mobutu government, and, most of them joined the Rwanda-backed ADFL force which was headed by Laurent Kabila.
• 1998: A war broke-out when Laurent Kabila, who was the President of the Congo at that time, purged Tutsi from the government and ordered Rwandan troops and Banyamulenge to leave the Congo.
• 2000: Banyamulenge civilians were terrorized by the Mai-Mai, Burundian Forces for the Defense of Democracy and the Rwandan Hutu Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR).
  

...Sources of Hostility

Immigration is never frictionless. By and large, whenever there is turmoil in host communities, the majority of the blame tends to be apportioned to immigrants. Generally, the higher the degree of linguistic, cultural, physical, and economic differences between the immigrants and their host communities; the greater the blame.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that tensions between the Banyarwanda and the indigenous groups were ever-present, and, that they tended to intensify in times of communal turmoil. 

In the absence of communal integration initiatives that would foster mutual respect and understanding, these tensions only festered and spawned incidents of violence between 'in-groups' and 'out-groups'.

The earliest record of hostilities between the Banyarwanda and indeginous populations in the Kivus can be found in the 1964 to 1965 period. In 1964, Banyamulenge in the DRC joined the Simba Rebellion that sought to depose Mobutu Sese Seko. 

However, they switched sides and joined pro-Mobutu Sese Seko forces when the Simba rebels stole their cattle. The neighbouring Bembe group, who were on the pro-rebel side, suffered heavy losses because of this loss of Banyarwanda support. This created inter-group tensions. 

As I stated elsewhere, between the 1970s and the 1980s, the Banyarwanda converted their collective identity to Banyamulenge, which loosely translates to "People of Mulenge". Naturally, this escallated the tensions between the Banyarwanda and the Bafuliro people (who were the original inhabitants of Mulenge).

It is important to note that the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in the DRC was largely confined to the eastern regions of the country. And, it only cropped-up in other parts of the country when the Congolese learnt, from Burundian Hutu immigrants, of the callous atrocities that were committed by the Tutsi-elites that controlled Burundi between 1971 and 1973.

It is also important to note that the Mobutu government used a divide and conquer strategy that magnified and exploited this anti-Banyarwanda sentiment. However, it is important to also stress that most Congolese citizens, outside the Kivus, had never encountered Banyarwanda, and thus, they did not harbour any hostilities towards them. 

Otherwise put: it is in recent times that these tensions grew.

The tensions that occurred in recent times can be abbreviated as follows:

• 1996 to 1998: Banyamulenge militia were fomed to fight the Mobutu government, and, a large contingent of the Banyamulenge joined the Rwanda-backed ADFL force which was headed by Laurent Kabila. The ADFL conducted “ Rwandan genocide revenge” killings in South Kivu; Hutu refugees (and militia) and many indigenous Congolese civilians were massacred. This created a strong anti-Tutsi sentiment on the path that the ADFL blazed (on its way to Kinshasa). When Laurent Kabila came into power, he used his force of Banyarwanda child soldiers, referred to as kadogos, from the Kivus to police Kinshasa. They tended to bludgeon people for 'offenses' like wearing short skirts, and, they largely infringed upon the civil liberties of the Congolese people. This magnified the anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in the DRC to levels that were heretofore unseen. Further, around that time, there was also a strong presence of Rwandan forces in the DRC. Congolese citizens generally did not appreciate their presence, and this culminated in an anti-Rwanda / anti-Tutsi parade that was led by Tshala Muana. Jason Stearns's narrative of the parade captures the intense toxicity of the anti-Tutsi sentiment that saturated Kinshasa, and I quote: "Tshala Mwana, a famous singer and allegedly the president’s mistress, led the parade dressed in white, tugging two goats on a leash with signs identifying them as Deo Bugera and Bizima Karaha, the two most famous Tutsi in Kabila’s government who had defected to join the rebellion. Some of the marchers brandished signs [that read]: 'We will make Rwanda the twelfth province of the Congo,' and 'No to Tutsi expansion in the DRC and Africa.'  As the cheering crowd looked on, the famous, brawny wrestler Edingwe—he could often be seen jogging and singing with his followers along the Kinshasa streets at dawn—stepped up and slit the animals’ throats".
• 1998 to 2003: The Rwandan-backed RCD force (that invaded the Congo after the Rwandans were expelled by Laurent Kabila) was met with the resistance of Kabila-backed "ethnic self-defence groups" (that were fighting against "foreign aggression"). The RCD's response to the resistance was to massacre the civilian populations that spawned these groups. Naturally, these massacres elevated the anti-Rwanda / anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC to stratospheric levels.
• 1999-2000: In 1999, the allegiance between Rwanda and Uganda became strained. They fought close to three battles on the streets of the diamond-rich city of Kisangani. In these battles, thousands of innocent Congolese civilians lost their lives. Between 1997 and 1999, Uganda's official exports of diamonds grew by a factor of ten, from USD198,000 to USD1.8 million. Further, between 1998 and 2000, Rwanda’s official exports of diamonds also grew from USD6,000 to USD1.7 million. Interestingly enough, Uganda and Rwanda have no known diamond reserves of their own [2]. Naturally, most Congolese citizens have explanations for where Uganda and Rwanda's diamond wealth came from. The common thread that runs across the explanations is: Kisangani.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that Rwanda's expeditions in the Congo have made a disproportionately large contribution to the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Congo. 

 ...Kabila's Constraint

In the run-up to the 2006 Congolese presidential election, Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo ran under the slogan: "One hundred percent Congolese". He portrayed Joseph Kabila as a "stooge" of the Rwandan government. Further, Bemba's surrogates used imagery like Illustration 4, a picture of Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame "on the training grounds" before the first Congo war, to give his message credibility and resonance:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)

In 2010, a tripartite agreement between the DRC, UNHCR and Rwanda, was concluded. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties to the agreement would oversee the repatriation of 55,000 Banyamulenge refugees (who were living in refugee camps in Rwanda).

When the first contingents of repatriated refugees arrived in the Congo, Kabila's detractors resumed whispering the "stooge" rhetoric. This rhetoric resonated among Congolese citizens who feared that their government was smuggling-in Rwandans [3] [5]. Understandably, these fears and the "stooge" rhetoric inevitably weakened Kabila's resolve to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

As everyone now appreciates, Mobutu Sese Seko was a tribalist who only cared about the welfare of his Ngbandi tribe. Otherwise put, it is reasonable to assert that 250 (out of the close to 251 tribes in the Congo) have got longstanding grievances that they would like the Kabila government to address.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that when the Kabila government tried to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge, he was accused (by some tribes) of favouritism. Understandably, this, again, weakened Kabila's resolve to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

In short, Kabila is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.

To incentivize him to address the grievances of the Banyamulenge, it is of critical importance to: 1) Acknowledge this fact, and; 2) Formulate a peace plan that would minimize the fallout of addressing the grievances of the Banyamulenge.

***

...Creating Lasting Peace

To create lasting peace, the Kabila government would need to do the following:

1. Acknowledge that the boarders of the Old Rwandan kingdom spilled into the Congo, as Illustration 2 shows, and, give the Rwandan government and its partners, the exclusive rights to exploit the minerals in that spill-over region, especially the territory that is labelled "This Land" in Illustration 2 under an equitable perpetual joint venture agreement (with the local communities). [This measure would give the Rwandan government a strong incentive to foster the stability of the Congo]. Each member of the local communities should have a stake in the mining ventures that enables him / her to earn a monthly cash stream which is multiples of the Congolese per capita income and minimum wage. This, would, in effect: help to address the grievances of the other tribes in the Congo; foster the development of trust between the Congolese and Rwandans, and; absolve the Kabila government of favouritism allegations when it moves to repatriate Banyamulenge. The peace agreement should have a phrase that says something to the effect of: "The Rwandan equity stake portion of the ventures would be expropriated if there is credible evidence that the Rwandan government is supporting mutineers, rebels or foreign invading forces that seek to destabilize the Congo".
2. Stipulate, in the peace agreement, that the reparations that would be made to the Banyamulenge would occur in the form of direct cash transfers to them. And, that these transfers would be made by Rwandan mining ventures that would be operating in the Congo. These expenditures could be deducted from the tax bills of the-said Rwandan mining firms. (I won't disclose my reasons for suggesting this).
3. Address the grassroots grievances of the Banyamulenge and their neighbouring communities, particularly the communities that they had altercations with e.g. the Bafuliro and the Bembe tribes.
4. Repatriate the refugees after steps 1 to 3 have been completed.

***

The human cost of the internecine conflict in the Congo has been too great; 5 million people have lost their lives, others remain displaced and young women continue to be violated in the most savage ways. Rwanda is not entirely responsible for all of these atrocities; there are countless rebel groups that operate in the Congo.

However, a growing body of evidence shows that the Rwandan elites played, and continue to play, a pivotal role in propagating the major conflicts that plunge the Congo into a deeper state of anarchy. [4]

In this post, I have demonstrated that these conflicts have contributed to the meteoric rise of the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the DRC.

Clearly, it is not in Rwanda's interests to continue to support armed conflict in the Congo.

***

[1] There is an element of truth in all the narratives - every single one of them!
[2] Source: Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/ 357, United Nations, April 12, 2001, 21.
[3] Source: Report from the Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project titled From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an armed Movement in Eastern Congo
[4] Criticism of the "foreign ventures" of Rwandan elites does not imply hostility towards Rwandan civilians.
[5] Between 1970 and 2012, the Congo's population grew at a mean rate of 3.065% per year. Therefore the total Banyamulenge population (i.e. Banyamulenge currently living in the DRC and Banyamulenge in the refugee camps in neighbouring countries) should approximately be equal to the total population of Banyamulenge in the Congo in 1970 with a mean growth rate of 3.065% per year.