On Kagame's Allegation: Did France Participate in the Genocide? Satellite Image Data Answers: "Maybe - on the 17th of July 1994"

"If we use the word 'genocide' and are seen as doing nothing, what will be the effect on the November [congressional] election?"

― Susan Rice (1994 National Security Council Advisor), 1994 NSC Call

“The truth will set you free, but first it will piss you off.”

― Gloria Steinem

"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."

― Arthur Schopenhauer

In his 5th of April 2014 interview with Jeune Africa Magazine, Mr. Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda, said and I quote [1]:

“The Western powers would like us to believe that Rwanda is an ordinary country; as if nothing ever happened [8]. This accords them the space to forget and distance themselves from their responsibilities, but it is impossible. A case in point is France. Twenty years after the genocide, the only thing we can tell the French to their faces is that they did not do enough to save lives during the genocide. This is a fact, but it glosses over the reality. Belgium and France played a direct role in the political preparation of the genocide and they participated in the genocide. Ask the survivors of the massacre that occurred in Bisesero in June of 1994 and they will tell you that the French soldiers, who were part of Operation Turquoise, did it.”

Before I explore the merits of the accusations that Mr. Paul Kagame leveled in the italicized sections of the quotation, I will start by discussing the context:

  

By all accounts, France's track record on the African continent is checkered, at best, and inordinately flawed, at worst. Otherwise put, it is very easy to ― rightfully or wrongfully ― link France to any nefarious activity that occurred in Francophone Africa; the defining feature of France's Africa Foreign policy was/is its ruthless amorality. 

Generally, during the period which intervenes (Valéry Giscard) d’Estaing and (Jacques René) Chirac's terms in office, France's Africa Foreign policy was predicated upon the following broad aims:

1. Maintaining France's control over the political and cultural spheres of Francophone states, with the underpinning goal of;
2. Maintaining and expanding France's control over the economic and financial spheres of Francophone states.

To protect her interests in Africa, France forged military allegiances with the governments of virtually all Francophone states, including the government of Juvénal Habyarimana (in 1975). 

When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda in 1990 ― i.e. four years before the Rwandan genocide occurred ― it threatened the contemporary geopolitical alignment, which buttressed France's Rwandan interests. Otherwise put, the attack on the Habyrimana government was tantamount to an attack on France.

***

...Four Years Before the Genocide Occurred: Invasion by Ugandan-Sponsored RPF Forces

"There are no 'good guys' in this story"

― Allan Stam

When the Ugandan-Sponsored RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990, it managed to bring large swathes of territory in North Western Rwanda under its fold. From the vantage point of the commune chiefs in the region, the RPF's push towards Kigali had immense chances of success. Owing to this belief, they cast their lot with, and lent their support to, the RPF. Succinctly; it was a forgone conclusion that the Rwandan Defense Forces (FAR) could not match then invading RPF in combat. And, that the RPF would march to Kigali unopposed.

In a bid to protect her interests and aid a pliant ally, France intervened militarily in the conflict and helped to bring the RPF's advance to a grinding halt. During the ensuing period, i.e. while the Arusha Accords were being negotiated and signed, France, in accordance with the terms of her military alliance with the Rwandan government, gave basic military training to a youth reserve force. Unbeknownst to France at the time, this youth reserve force would evolve into the Interahamwe; the militia that would execute the genocide in 1994.

Otherwise put, France did, as Paul Kagame suggests, help to prepare for the genocide (albeit indirectly). Her military trained the Génocidaires. However, it is important to point out that there is no credible evidence which suggests that France trained the Génocidaires with the intent to bolster their capabilities to commit acts of genocide. 

Rather, all the evidence in the public domain suggests that she trained the Génocidaires with the intent to bolster their collective ability to thwart, what was theretofore, widely perceived as a foreign-sponsored invading force (which sought to depose, via violent means, a legitimately elected government). 

Further, the military training that France gave to the-said youth reserve force was part of an ongoing military collaborative relationship between France and Rwanda. This collaborative relationship was/is permissible under international law, and, is analogous to the relationship that France has in place (since 1960) with; Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Togo, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville and the Central African Republic.

...On whether France participated in the Genocide

I think that the most serious aspect of Mr. Paul Kagame's allegation is the suggestion that French troops participated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.

To explore the merits of this allegation, it is prudent to start by determining when French troops were in Rwanda and when they "left". The abbreviated timeline in Illustration 1, below, will aid this endeavor:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: UN Independent Inquiry, 1999, and; Soderlund et al., 2008

 

As Illustration 1 shows, prior to the 14th of April 1994, French troops were part of the UNAMIR peacekeeping force which was mandated to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords [6]. After a contingent of Belgian peacekeepers was executed by members of the Rwandan Presidential Guard, i.e. on the 7th of April 1994, France was compelled to shift her priorities from peacekeeping to the evacuation of French nationals and troops.

Further, Illustration 1 shows that there were no "battle-ready" French Troops in Rwanda between the middle of April 1994 and the 22nd of June 1994. To be more precise; according to Soderland et al, 2008, while France's troops had officially "left" Rwanda by the 10th of April 1994, France did maintain a para-battalion of troops which was stationed in Kigali.

Between the middle April of 1994 and the 22nd of June 1994, this para-battalion force was dormant. Otherwise put, the battalion did not provide the UNAMIR peacekeeping force with any form of assistance. According to all indications, the "para-battalion" force did nothing during the captioned time period.

Thus, this suggests that French troops cannot be held to account for (committing) the atrocities that occurred after the 15th of April 1994 and before the 23rd of June 1994. 

As Illustration 1 shows, on the 23rd of June 1994, a contingent of 2,550 French troops and 500 troops from Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Egypt, Niger and the Republic of the Congo arrived in Rwanda.

They were mandated, by the UN, to establish a "safe-zone" in the South Western region of Rwanda. This mission was christened, by the French, Operation Turquoise. And, it was under the command of General Jacques Hogard.

***

To recap: In the quote that opened this post, Mr. Paul Kagame alleges that the French contingent of Operation Turquoise helped the Génocidaires, sometime in June of 1994, to commit the callous atrocities that occurred in the Bisesero region of Rwanda.

In the forthcoming sections of this post, I will use reconnaissance satellite image data on battle-front positions, and, records of the atrocities that occurred during the Rwandan genocide to explore whether Mr. Kagame's allegation has any merit.

***

Paul: “Yes, General. I am glad you came by. I overheard something that I think you should know about.”
General Bizimungu: “What did you overhear?”
Paul: “A discussion between an American Embassy official and a UN Colonel.”
General Bizimungu: “What did they say?”
Paul: “The American assured the colonel that they would watch everything.”
General Bizimungu: “Watch everything? How? They are gone.”

Paul points surreptitiously to the sky. The General looks up.

Paul: “Satellites.”
General Bizimungu: “Satellites?”
Paul: “Yes, they can photograph the epaulets on your shoulder.”
General Bizimungu: “And what will they do with these satellites?”
Paul: “The American said intervention is too costly, better to get photographic evidence and snatch up the high command.”
General Bizimungu: “The high command? Our high command?”
Paul: “'Snatch them up and put on a war crimes trial. Lock them all away forever. No political risk, and big publicity.' That's what he said… I thought I'd better tell you.”

The General looks again to the sky then.

General Bizimungu: “The Americans! Who are they to put us on trial?”   

― Exchange from the 2004 Historical Drama Film, Hotel Rwanda

The first challenge I faced was to identify exactly where Bisesero was situated. To aid my endeavor, I consulted the Great Oracle of our modern age, Google Maps. Illustration 2 sums-up what I discovered:

Illustration 2 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Google Maps, 2014

I soon discovered that Bisesero was a mountain range in Rwanda, which is in the vicinity of the following locales; Kibuye, Gisovu and Gishyita. 

In this post, the Bisesero Massacres will be taken as any massacre that occurred, in June of 1994, within a 10 mile or 16.10 kilometer radius of Gisovu, i.e. the marked spot in Illustration 2.

After I had located Bisesero, I then faced the following challenges:

• Locating a dataset of the atrocities that occurred during the Rwandan genocide. I needed a dataset that would stipulate where an atrocity occurred, who the perpetrators were and when it occurred, i.e. an event catalogue.
• Locating a dataset of the battle-front, troop movements and the territory that was controlled by the RPF, the FAR and the Operation Turquoise Force.

Otherwise put, I was looking for an integrated dataset with four dimensions; 1) Killings, 2) Geography, 3) Battle-Fronts / Troop Movements and 4) Time. 

Interestingly enough, there is only one research project in the world that built the four-dimensional dataset that I sought; the Genodynamics project that was spearheaded by Professors Allan Stam and Christian Davenport.

From the outset, I have to point out that the project is inexorably controversial in certain circles [2] [9]. The controversy does not stem from the methodology that was employed to collect the data. It largely stems from the conclusions that the researchers drew from the data. 

When one uses a dataset that underpins the controversial conclusions of a research project, like the one that was conducted by Professors Allan Stam (Stam) and Christian Davenport (Davenport), it is important to be transparent on the aspects of the research findings that will or will not be used [9]. 

Table 1 expositions the seven dimensions of the Genodynamics project (I will not discuss most of the things that are shaded in grey):

Table 1 (click on table to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004

In this post I will use the dimensions of the Genodynamics project that attract limited controversy, including; 1) Nature of the Killings, 2) Types of the Killings, and 3) The Perpetrators of the Killings.

***

Before I explore the merits of the allegations that were leveled by Mr. Paul Kagame, I'll start by briefly discussing how the data that underpins the Genodynamics project was collected. With this specific research project, it is of critical importance to be transparent:

Illustration 3 shows the data sources that were used to construct a database of the atrocities that occurred during the Rwandan Genocide:

Illustration 3 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Stam, 2009, and; Davenport, 2010

As Illustration 3 shows, the killings database of the Genodynamics project was primarily built using:

• Ten sources of data.
• Both Rwandan sources and International sources.
• Datasets that covered both large scale killings and the (other) killings that occurred throughout Rwanda.

The principal sources of data that will be used in this particular post to establish the killings that occurred in Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide include:

1. The Rwandan Ministry of Education: The Rwandan Ministry of Education conducted a house-to-house survey to establish the number of killings that occurred in each prefecture.
2. The Rwandan Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport: Conducted a mass-grave identification programme. The exercise identified a total of 130 mass-graves. Davenport and Stam visited a sample of 85 out of the 130 mass-grave sites to verify whether they existed or not. [3]
3. Ruzibiza Deposition.
4. Physicians for Human Rights: Exhumed one of the mass-graves to identify if the remains in the mass-graves corresponded with the reported totals. [4] 
5. Human Rights Watch: Collected 12,000 witness testimonies. These testimonies were used, in the Genodynamics project, to establish exactly when the killings in each region began.

Like the Genodynamics flagship presentation, this post will use a median estimate of the casualties that were reported by all five of the above-mentioned sources. Otherwise put, the killings that were not reported by all five sources will not be considered.

To establish the battle-fronts and the territories that were controlled by RPF, FAR and Operation Turquoise, Davenport and Stam used the following five step methodology:

1. Acquire Reconnaissance Satellite Data: The Canadian Military had reconnaissance satellites that were monitoring troop positions in Rwanda during the entire duration of the genocide. Davenport and Stam obtained this reconnaissance satellite imagery and used it as a starting point; [5]
2. Verify Troop Positions Using US Defense Intelligence Estimates: The authors verified the troop positions that were captured by the reconnaissance satellites using de-classified US Defense Intelligence estimates;
3. Verify Troop Positions Using CIA National Intelligence Estimates: They obtained, through the Freedom of Information Act, the troop positions of each side in the conflict. Using the de-classified CIA National Intelligence estimates, they verified the troop positions;
4. Verify Troop Positions Using Kuperman's Estimates: They revised the data to incorporate the troop positions that underpin the treatise which Professor Alan J. Kuperman presents in The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda.
5. Verify Troop Positions Using Combatant Accounts: Davenport and Stam's research collaborator, Professor Peter Erlinder, an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda defense lawyer iteratively discussed, separately of course, the battle-front and territory data that his team had collected with RPF members (see Map 1, Map 2, Map 3 and Map 4 here), the UN and members of the FAR. He incorporated their feedback into the template that his team had built.

Hence, it is reasonable to assert that the troop position, battle-front and territory data that will be used in this post represents: 1) the opinions of the principal players in the conflict, and; 2) the intelligence that was gathered by US and Canadian governments. 

When Davenport and Stam collected the data, they discovered that there wasn't much variance between the troop positions that were declared by all the sources.

***

To help interpret the information in the Illustrations that will follow, here is a rough key:

• A zone which is shaded in Green: Was under the control of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) on the given date.
• A White zone: Was under the control of the Rwandan Defense Forces (FAR) or the Interahamwe on the given date.
• A zone which is shaded in Turquoise: Was under the control of the French Army on the given date.
• A solid Green line or edge: Indicates the RPF's battlefront on the given date.
• A solid Blue line or edge: Indicates the French's battlefront on the given date.
• Orange shading: Indicates that an atrocity occurred in the prefecture on the given date. The deeper the shade of orange; the greater the number of killings.

Further the atrocities that occur:

• Along the Battlefront: Are defined as Combat Deaths.
• Behind the Battlefront: Are defined as Reprisal Killings, Politicide or Random Killings.

***

As I alluded to before, French Operation Turquoise troops officially set foot in Rwanda on the 23rd of June in 1994. However, as Illustration 4 clearly demonstrates, the French did not have any battle-front position on the date:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004 [7]

The only massacre that occurred in the target region (refer back to Illustration 2), occurred in Kibuye; i.e. in the territory that was controlled by the FAR.

Illustration 5, below, shows, a massacre that occurred in Rwanda on the 24th of June 1994:

Illustration 5 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004

As Illustration 5 demonstrates, the French did not have a battle front position on the date; the massacre occurred in FAR-controlled territories.

Illustration 6, below, shows two massacres that occurred in Rwanda on the 27th of June 1994:

Illustration 6 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004

Of the two massacres, the killings that occurred in the commune near Kibuye fall in the target region (refer back to Illustration 2). However, they occurred in a territory that was controlled by the FAR; the French did not have any battleground position on the date.

Illustration 7, below, shows a massacre that occurred in Rwanda on the 28th of June 1994:

Illustration 7 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004

As Illustration 7 shows, the massacre occurred in the target region (refer back to Illustration 2). However, the French did not have any battleground position on the date.

***

To close off, according the data at hand, the French did not have any battleground positions during the entire month of June.

From the data, one can deduce the following: Between the 23rd and the 30th of June 1994, French troops were probably establishing a base, securing the perimeter and sending off reconnaissance scouts to probe the area. 

Otherwise put, the French did not have command control over the regions wherein the massacres (that Kagame cites) occurred. Thus, it is reasonable to assert that the FAR was probably responsible for the killings that occurred during the month of June 1994.

This does not imply that Mr. Paul Kagame made a baseless allegation; it simply suggests that: he may have based his allegation on witness accounts that have inaccurate dates, or, that the battle front data that I used does not fully capture the dynamics of the battleground. Or, maybe he is correct; there was a French para-battalion that was stationed in Kigali when the genocide occurred. Could the para-battalion have committed the-said atrocities?

***

According to the data, the French only had a discernible battleground position in Rwanda on the 4th of July 1994 as Illustration 8, below, shows:

Illustration 8 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004

Illustration 8 clearly shows that killings occurred along the French-FAR battlefront on the 4th of July 1994. These killings occurred in the target zone (refer back to Illustration 2).

Technically, the-said killings cannot be defined as genocidal killings because they occurred along the battlefront. However, given the allegations that Mr. Paul Kagame leveled, it would be wise to conduct a detailed investigation into: the nature of the killings that occurred on the 4th of July 1994 and the perpetrators of the atrocities. 

Illustration 9, below, depicts atrocities that occurred in Rwanda on the 17th of July in 1994:

Illustration 9 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Davenport and Stam, 2004

As Illustration 9 clearly demonstrates, the killings occurred in the Turquoise Zone, i.e. a zone that was under the territorial jurisdiction of the French. This zone lies behind the French-FAR battle-front. And thus, the killings could either be defined as Genocide, Politicide, Reprisal Killings or Random Violence. 

Approximately 85 lives were lost in this incident.

Clearly, it is important to stress that the existence of the 17th of July 1994 killings lends credence to the allegations that Mr. Paul Kagame leveled; the French had command control over the region wherein the killings occurred.

Thus, it would be prudent to conduct further investigations to establish:

1. The contextual factors.
2. The nature of the killings.
3. The perpetrators of the atrocities.

Meaningful reconciliation can only occur in Rwanda when all the unpleasant truths are known.


[1] Be advised this is an English Translation of a French Translation of an interview that Mr. Paul Kagame gave in English. Otherwise put, it isn't a verbatim quotation. However, it should accurately capture the gist of Mr. Paul Kagame's statement.
[2] The principal collaborators in the project, Davenport and Stam, were both declared persona non-grata in Rwanda. Because of the misinterpretation of his research conclusions, Christian Davenport was harassed and he (and members of his family) received numerous death threats. Further, Peter Erlinder, a UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Defense lawyer, author and research collaborator on the project, was arrested and tried in 2010 for "promoting genocide ideologies" and for links to the FDLR, i.e. the Génocidaires. Owing to this episode, Peter Erlinder suffers from Post Stress Traumatic Disorder (PSTD). Generally, all the members of this research projected were savagely attacked and vilified by the Rwandan Public Relations Machine. 
[3] The site visits positively verified the existence of all the 85 mass graves in the sample.
[4] The exercise confirmed that the declared cadaver count in the mass grave tallied with the actual number of remains in the mass grave.
[5] It took Davenport 3 years to obtain that reconnaissance satellite footage.
[6] It is important to stress that the force did not have the mandate to engage in combat.
[7] As Illustration 4 clearly shows, the data suggests that the RPF, i.e.  Mr. Kagame's army, conducted reprisal killings near the commune of Gitarama on the 23rd of June 1994. In aggregate, the data provides prima facie evidence for a total of 1,683 RPF Reprisal Killings. Otherwise put, the data suggests that there are no pure knights in shining armor in this story. A verbatim quote that helps to explain why no one talks about this: "We used communication and information warfare better than anyone.We have found a new way of doing things." ― Mr. Paul Kagame (Source of Quote: Gowing, N., (1998) ‘New challenges and problems for information management in complex emergencies: ominous lessons from the Great Lakes and eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997’. Paper presented at Dispatches from Disaster Zones conference, Oxford)
[8] This is clearly an instance of the use of the 'narrative of difference' that Van Leeuwen (2001) wrote of in ‘Rwanda’s Imidugudu programme and earlier experiences with villagization and resettlement in East Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (2001), pp. 623–44.
[9] For an abbreviated and easily digestible narrative of Davenport and Stam's (2010) research findings read: What Really Happened in Rwanda?

Rwanda: History, Development and the Risk of Unrest between 2021 and 2030

Since the end of the 1994 Genocide, Rwanda's Human Development Indicators (HDIs) have been on a steady uptrend as Illustration 1 below shows:

Illustration 1 (click on illustration to zoom in)

While Rwanda's HDI Indice is still below the African average (Rwanda's was 0.429 in 2011 versus 0.448 for the rest of Africa), Rwanda's progress is, by all standards, phenomenal. The nation's government and development partners should be lauded for their achievements.

Rwanda has been on most frontier market investors' radars for a while. However, the "media attention" that the country is attracting has compelled most investors to stay on the sidelines while they wait and see how the situation progresses.

Truth be told, I did not know much about Rwanda's history until last week; i.e.  I did not know much about Rwanda's history until I went through the expert testimonies from the December 11th 2012 Africa Sub-Committee hearing on The Crisis in the DRC.

As I watched the hearing video, I was confronted by the superficiality of my knowledge on the history of Africa's Great Lakes region.

In this blog post, I will share what I learnt about Rwanda as I poured through a voluminous collection of articles, books, research publications and current affairs discussions.

I will start by discussing the "ethnic" make-up of Rwanda and how colonization morphed it into a caste system. I will then discuss the causes of the 1994 genocide; particularly how they were linked to high population density and falling coffee prices.

I will close off by discussing the developmental challenges that Rwanda is certain to face in a decade, and, I will exposition the risks that they would create.


...Tutsi and Hutu

 "History is mostly guessing; the rest is prejudice"

 - Will Durant

Illustration 2 below sums up the most probable origins of the two major ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi; Tutsi and Hutu:

Illustration 2 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Generally, anthropologists assert that Hutu are a Bantu people. According to Joseph Greenberg's widely accepted theory on the origins of Bantu peoples, they originated from South Western Nigeria.

Around 1500 BC, see B1 in Illustration 2, the first wave of Bantu people left its ancestral homeland and headed towards the Great Lakes region. There is the remote possibility that modern day Hutu descended from this Bantu stock.

Alternatively, Hutu could have descended from the 8th wave of Bantu migrants who relocated from the South West of Africa, see B8 in Illustration 2, around 500 BC. In my opinion, the latter hypothesis has got a higher probability of being valid.

However, it is important to stress that the Great Lakes region was a Bantu migration hub, i.e. a locus point of Bantu migration; the Hutu could have originated from members of other Bantu migration waves who elected to stay in the Great Lakes region, while their clansmen moved on.

Rwanda was an attractive settlement choice for the first Hutu owing to the following characteristics:

• High Altitude: Mosquitoes and Tsetse flies do not breed at high altitudes. Thus, settling in the Rwanda region meant fewer cases of malaria and "sleeping sickness", i.e. better health and better quality of life.
• Moderate Precipitation: The precipitation was moderate and favorable to agriculture (the Bantu were predominantly farmers).

When the Hutu settled in the Great Lakes region, they lived alongside the indigenous inhabitants of the land, who are called the Twa (or pejoratively referred to as the pygmies). The Twa were/are a hunter gatherer people who live/lived within the peripheries of equatorial rain forests. [5]

It is difficult to establish if there were interactions between the Twa and the Hutu. However, there are strong indications that the groups remained in relative isolation from each other.

According to the Hamitic Hypothesis (which was propounded by John Hanning Speke and later served as the rallying point for génocidaires), the Tutsi were a Nilotic group of pastoralists that settled in the Rwanda-Burundi region sometime after AD 800.

They may have originated from Chad [1]. A small group of the Tutsi wandered to the South East, see C? in Illustration 3, and settled in Rwanda and Burundi.

They assimilated Hutu into their societal structure as Illustration 3 below shows:

Illustration 3 (click on illustration to zoom in)

In his essay which is entitled The Cultural Face of Rwandan Genocide, Christopher Taylor asserts that the Tutsi king, in Illustration 3, was regarded as a divine being; through him, blessings suppossedly flowed to the rest of mankind. In hard times, i.e. "when the flow of blessings would be blocked", the Tutsi King would be sacrificed to unblock the flow of blessings.

The Courtiers or Elders, in Illustration 3, were a small group of Tutsi aides to the king.

As Illustration 3 shows, the majority of the Tutsi were commoners [2].

According to Jarred Diamond's account in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Succeed or Fail, The Hutu joined the ranks of the Tutsi commoners, as is shown in Illustration 3, where they intermarried with Tutsi and could switch to become Tutsi (if they switched economic roles from crop farming to animal husbandry).


...Colonial History

When the Germans (and later the Belgians) colonized Rwanda and Burundi, they found it expedient to govern through Tutsi Intermediaries. They believed that Tutsi were racially superior to Hutu (because of the Hamitic appearance of Tutsi).

Under Belgian rule, anyone who had a Hamitic appearance or at least eight head of cattle was regarded as a Tutsi, and the rest were Hutu. Different privileges came with the different labels.

In 1930, everyone was required to carry an identity card that would stipulate their ethnicity.

The colonial Rwandan-Burundian society was gradated as follows:

Illustration 4 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 4 shows, of the African peoples in Burundi and Rwanda, Tutsi had the superior status. And, the Twa lay at the very bottom of the pyramid. Under Belgian rule, the ethnic make-up of Rwanda and Burundi was essentially similar, as Illustration 5, below, shows:

Illustration 5 (click on illustration to zoom in)

During the late 1950s, the Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi grew restless with the social order. Owing to this, they created political movements that would champion their causes.

Increasingly, the conservative members of the Belgian elite were being supplanted by more liberal elites who were sympathetic to the Hutu. In 1962, this liberal metamorphosis of the Belgian power structures culminated in the independence of both Rwanda and Burundi.

As independence was approaching, the Hutu movement, in both Rwanda and Burundi, geared itself to overturn the pecking order by supplanting "Tutsi domination" with "Hutu domination". Violent skirmishes broke out and they festered into bloodletting orgies in which Hutu killed Tutsi and Tutsi killed Hutu.

Illustration 6 below sums up the key events that occurred in post-1950 Rwanda and Burundi. 

Illustration 6 (download image for a better view)

In Burundi, Tutsi hegemony was retained, while it was supplanted by Hutu domination in Rwanda.


...Mass Killings

From Illustration 6, Illustration 7 below, can be derived. It sums-up the key mass killings that occurred in Rwanda in the post-independence era.

Illustration 7 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 7 shows, power in Rwanda generally changes hands between a Tutsi elite and a Hutu elite. At these transition points, mass killings occur.

The mass killings that occurred in Rwanda can be summed as follows:

1. In 1963, a contingent of Tutsi refugees, who had fled the unrest in Rwanda and settled in Burundi, formed a rebel group that made a failed incursion into Rwanda. In response to this, the Hutu in Rwanda killed at least 20,000 Tutsi.
2. Between 1971 and 1973, Hutu in Burundi tried to seize power violently. They failed and the government in Burundi killed at least 100,000 Hutu. In Rwanda, revenge killings of Tutsi ensued immediately (it is hard to establish the exact body count).
3. The 1994 Genocide in which between 800,000 and 1.3 million people were killed by the Interahamwe Hutu militia and Hutu civilians (the majority of the murdered people were Tutsi and moderate Hutu, and, around 10,000 Twa). A further 25,000 - 60,000 Hutu were killed by the RPF's mostly-Tutsi army (i.e. reprisal killings occurred). [3] [4]
4. Between 1997 and 2003, an unsubstantiated number of Hutu refugees and militia, who lived in refugee camps in the DRC, were killed by the RPF-backed Banyamulenge militia.
5. Between the late 1990s and now: (I did not include this in Illustration 7) In the North Kivu region (DRC), there are approximately 22 militia groups that roam the rain forests. These groups are predominantly off-shoots of the groups that participated in the Rwandan genocide and the first Congo war. Unable to fend for themselves in the rain forests, and with limited support from the outside world; these rebel groups periodically "prey upon" the Twa (in both the literal and figurative sense). The Twa refer to these groups as Les Effaceurs (i.e. the erasers). 

One thing that stands out about the mass killings that occurred in Rwanda and Burundi is: there is a causative link between the massacres; the massacres that occurred in Rwanda were inversely related to the massacres that occurred in Burundi.

Succinctly put, killings of Tutsi in Rwanda triggered killings of Hutu in Burundi, and killings of Hutu in Burundi triggered killings of Tutsi in Rwanda.


...Genocide

The widely accepted narrative of the Rwandan genocide originated from Allison Des Forges's expert testimony. This is the version that I'll abbreviate in this post [6]:

The Rwandan genocide was not spontaneous, it was concocted by hardliners in Habyarimana's government - who did not want the Arusha Peace Agreement to be implemented. The genocide had five principal phases:

• Phase 1: Like a classical coup, Phase 1 involved eliminating the moderates. This was done in the hours following Habyarimana's death by members of the presidential guard and the army. It basically entailed taking-out anyone who supported the implementation of the power sharing agreement, or, anyone who could impede the ethnic cleansing agenda.
• Phase 2: Take-out influential Tutsi and Hutu who would benefit from the emergent political dispensation, and Tutsi who were suspected of supporting the RPF. This was done in the hours between Habyarimana and Uwilingiyimana's deaths.
• Phase 3: Mount "elimination checkpoints" on every highway/street in Rwanda. This was initially done by members of the presidential guard. And, it was subsequently taken over by Interahamwe militia who initially sprayed suspected Tutsi with bullets. When the bullets ran out, they hacked people with machetes.
• Phase 4: Mobilize the masses to form autonomous killing brigades that would take-out their Tutsi neighbors and moderate Hutu. This struck fear in the heart of Tutsi and Hutu moderates, which set the tone for Phase 5.
• Phase 5: Encourage Tutsi and moderate Hutu to congregate at "protected/safe" places, like churches, stadiums, government buildings, hospitals and halls. This "round-up" strategy made the task of locating targets easier for the Interahamwe, and accounted for the lion's share of the body count.

Evidently, Phase 4 of the genocide harnessed the energies of civilians, which begs the question: What made the masses amenable to killing their relatives, colleagues, neighbors, teachers, students, doctors and their friends?

Illustration 8 below uses the metaphor of a bomb to exposition the confluence of the internal and external factors that spawned the Rwandan Genocide:

Illustration 8 (click on illustration to zoom in)

In this post, I will only discuss three factors using empirical data. They include Inequality, Falling Coffee Prices and High Population density:

1) Inequality

As Illustration 9, below, shows, Rwanda's Gini coefficient reached the 0.4 threshold for social unrest in the first quarter of 1993, i.e. exactly a year before the 1994 genocide:

Illustration 9 (click on illustration to zoom in)

Hence, one can conclude that an incident of social unrest of the "class warfare variety" was regrettably inevitable in Rwanda. The Hutu political elites knew that their popularity was waning and youth unemployment was high. They managed to harness and channel that public discontent towards the extermination of Hutu political foes and Tutsi.

2) Falling Coffee Prices

Rwanda's principal exports were coffee and tea, and, as Illustration 10 below shows, the price of coffee was on a steady downtrend since November of 1989:

Illustration 10 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted from: Index Mundi

Around that time, 70% of Rwanda's population engaged in agriculture. By and large, most of the people were semi-subsistence farmers. Plummeting coffee prices intensified the suffering of the Rwandan poor; it created a restive population.

3) Overpopulation

In 1994, Rwanda had a population density of around 760 people per square kilometer as is shown in Illustration 11 below:

Illustration 11 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted from: NASA Visible Earth

Rwanda was, and still remains, the most densely populated country in Africa. In 1985, all arable land in Rwanda, apart from National Parks, was being used for agriculture, such that, by 1994 the average Rwandan farm was smaller than one hectare. Thus, plots could no longer be periodically left fallow to preserve their fertility; they tended to be over-exploited. 

Over-exploitation of land, in a country with a hilly topography, translated into the rapid erosion of fertile top soils. This, in turn, translated into declining yields while population was steadily growing at the rate of 3% per year. Generally, hungry people are angry people.

According to Jarred Diamond, high population densities essentially meant that all the land in communes like Kanama was taken-up. Owing to this, young adults were increasingly delaying to start their own households. In Kanama's 20-25 year cohort, the percentage of young women who were still staying at home with their parents rose from 39% in 1988 to 67% in 1993; while for young men the number rose from 71% to 100% (during the same time-period). Crudely put, there were no young men who were independent in the Kanama region. It is such dependent young men who were recruited into killing brigades.

...Whither Rwanda?

In his book, entitled An Essay on the Principle of Population, Malthus wrote: "The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man". When I look at charts, like Illustration 12 below, I tend to see the merit in Malthus' assertion:

Illustration 12 (click on illustration to zoom in)

As Illustration 12 shows, the two most recent incidents of mass killings that occurred in Rwanda / that had "Rwandan involvement", transpired just after the rate of population growth exceeded the food production per capita growth rate. Hence, I wonder if this avers Malthus's above-mentioned assertion; would Malthusian checks, materializing in the form of mass killings, be acting to "bring population down to the carrying capacity of the land"? Or, are these mere coincidences?

***

According to Illustration 13, below, all Rwandans were able to get the minimum recommended daily intake of calories by the beginning of 2008:

Illustration 13 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted from: World Bank Data

However, Rwandans' daily intake of protein fell below the recommended daily intake mid-2010, and the nation's intake of lipids still hovers below the recommended daily intake. Therefore it is reasonable to anticipate, in the very near future, a proliferation of the following diseases, especially in the poorest areas:

• Protein deficiency diseases like Marasmus in young children, Kwashiorkor in infants, and, Chachexia in people with cancer, AIDS, chronic kidney failure, heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and rheumatoid arthritis.
• Lipid deficiency diseases like tooth decay and lipid oxidation disorder.

These diseases could have a negative impact on the productivity of Rwanda's population in the future.

The rate of economic growth in Rwanda (7.5% in 2010) still hovers above the population growth rate (2.82% in 2010). And, as Illustration 13 unequivocally shows, Rwanda's calorific intake lies comfortably above the WHO recommended daily intake of calories. Therefore does this imply that Rwanda has escaped the Malthusian trap? My answer to that question would be: Yes. Does this imply that the risk of societal unrest in Rwanda has gone down? To answer that question, I will quote from a paper that was authored by Korotayev et al (2011) entitled A Trap At The Escape From The Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in Modern Africa and West Asia:

"El Salvador, Iran, and Algeria, whose populations in the early 1960s were at the level of undernourishment, or even famine, all managed to achieve a very significant progress in the decades before instability struck. El Salvador increased its per capita food consumption by 700 kcal/day and by 1980— the year when civil war broke out —almost reached the WHO recommended norm of 2300 kcal/capita/day (Naiken 2002). Iran also increased its per capita food consumption by 700 kcal/day (from 1800 in 1960 to more than 2500 in 1979) at the point when the country was swept by the Islamic Revolution. Algeria achieved even better progress, going over the WHO norm in 1977 with continuing growth thereafter. The civil war broke out in 1992 when per capita food consumption reached more than 2900 kcal/day, or nowhere near the undernourishment level (and approaching that of overeating). In Albania, Egypt, Liberia, South Korea, and Syria, similarly, outbreaks of political violence occurred against the background of rapidly increasing per capita food consumption. Thus, Liberian food consumption went up from 2100 kcal/capita/day in 1960 to 2500 (better than the WHO norm) by 1989, the year of civil war start."

Succinctly put, escape from the "Malthusian trap" does not immunize a society against civil unrest.

***

Rwanda aims to transform itself from a subsistence agricultural to a knowledge-based economy by 2020. One of the goals of Rwanda's'Vision 2020’ is to decrease the population dependent upon agricultural
activities from 85% to 50%. This translates to a decrease of 35 percentage points by the year 2020. The country is making serious strides towards this desired end state, they include:

• Building a super-fast information communications grid: According to the NetIndex Household download Index, Rwanda has got the fastest household internet download speed in Africa. It currently stands at number 65 in the world with an average household download speed of 8.11 Mbps.
• Creating competency-building partnerships: Recently, the Rwandan government partnered Carnegie Mellon for the development of graduate engineering degrees. Under this partnership, "Carnegie Mellon will establish and operate an academic program in Kigali, Rwanda, initially offering a Master of Science in Information Technology program. In addition to the academic program, CMU-Rwanda will collaborate with the Government of Rwanda to develop an innovation incubator, advanced practical training programs, executive education programs and a mobility research center." (source)
• Establishing technology hubs: Early in 2012, Rwanda announced its plans to launch a technology hub called kLab. The hub will be based in Rwanda’s ICT Park and it envisages to co-locate students, engineers and designers. This should allow different ideas to cross pollinate and spawn an ecosystem of tech start-ups.
• Securing lines of financing: In conjunction with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the Rwandan government established the Rwanda Innovation Endowment Fund (RIEF) to foster the development of innovative start-ups.

It would be interesting to follow the companies that are spawned by these initiatives.

***

As Illustration 14, below, shows, the contribution that agriculture is making to Rwandan GDP is on a steady downtrend, while the contribution of services to Rwandan GDP is on a steady uptrend:

Illustration 14 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted from: World Bank Data

These trends suggest that non-agricultural sectors will dominate future narratives of Rwanda's growth story.

Although the Rwandan agricultural sector's contribution to GDP would continue to be dwarfed by the contribution of non-agricultural sectors, its productivity will probably continue to follow the trend in Illustration 15 below:

Illustration 15 (click on illustration to zoom in) Source: World Development Indicator database

The combination of growing non-agricultural sectors, increasing agricultural sector productivity and Rwanda's youth bulge give Rwanda a high probability of following the green trajectory in Illustration 16 below:

Illustration 16  (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted From: Korotayev et al 2011

Such a trajectory is associated with a high risk of political instability that stems from an explosive growth in the urban youth population. 

In their research, Korotayev et al (2011) teased data from 1960 to 2005 and found that "the probability of major internal violent conflicts in countries with very low young urban population growth rates (less than 15 percent increase per 5 years) was very low. For countries with intermediate values of these rates (20–30 percent increase per 5 years) the probability of such conflicts was close to 50 percent. However, even for this group of countries there was not a single occurrence of a particularly violent internal political upheaval in the given period. In countries with high young urban population growth rates (30–45 percent increase per 5 years) the probability of avoiding major political upheavals falls down to a very low level (about one chance out of four). Additionally, the probability of a particularly violent civil war becomes very high in these countries (also about one chance out of four). In countries in which the young urban population growth rates were very high (>45 percent increase in 5 years) not a single one managed to avoid major political shocks. The risk of a particularly violent civil war was very high for these countries (about one chance out of two)."

In their paper, entitled A Trap at The Escape From The Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in Modern Africa and West Asia, Korotayev et al (2011) computed the risk of instability of African countries using the above-mentioned link between population structure and destabilization. Their findings can be abbreviated in Illustration 17, as follows:

Illustration 17 (click on illustration to zoom in) Adapted from: Korotayev et al 2011

According to Illustration 17, the entire Great Lakes Region, including Rwanda, faces medium to high risks of political destabilization between 2021 and 2035.This begs the question of what type(s) of political destabilization. The answer to that question is: it depends on the confluence of different factors that are too difficult to forecast accurately, at this point.

Keep watching Rwanda!

***

[1] In school, most Rwandan baby boomers were taught that the Tutsi came from Ethiopia. And, that, it was in fact the Hutu who came from Chad and Niger.

[2] According to some accounts, a Tutsi king called Rujugira consolidated the Rwandan state in the eighteenth century. He built a large military apparatus and proceeded to subjugate disparate clans (some clans were made up of both Tutsi and Hutu). The protracted military campaigns required funding, and, an administrative bureaucracy, that was largely made up of Tutsi was created to collect taxes.
[3] It is important to note that the mass killings only stopped when Kagame's RPF defeated the Hutu militia. When the RPF arrived in most towns, the Tutsi population had been completely decimated. And, the Hutu militia were now eliminating prosperous Hutu. Kagame's victory was swift because 1) the Hutu militia had mounted multiple road blocks on every road - it had spread its forces out - and thus, it could not mount a coordinated resistance effort (with critical mass); 2) the Hutu militia had run out of ammunition when it was eliminating civilians, and, the arms embargo that had been instituted by the international community meant that it could not replenish its stocks; 3) The Hutu army experienced a number of defections - some soldiers were repelled by what was happening and joined Kagame; 4) The Hutu militia were undisciplined - they spent their time drinking and raping women - they were not in fighting shape, and; 5) The Hutu militia had numerous parallel lines of command that often passed conflicting orders.
[4] A few lessons for survival that I gleaned from researching the Rwandan Genocide: 1) Whenever politicians are being assassinated and there is rhetoric about exterminating a certain ethnic group, run away immediately -  the violence will only cascade – no one is safe; 2) If you have to hide when a paroxysm occurs, do not hide in designated "safe places" - as it makes it easier for the exterminators to find you; 3) The international community will not act unless it is in its strategic interests to do so - it will never intervene to JUST save civilians; 4) International peace keeping forces are always under resourced, and more often than not, they fail to keep civilians safe; 5) It takes a long time for international peace keeping forces to be deployed - because generally no one wants to foot the bills, contribute the troops or the hardware; 6) If enough soldiers from a peace-keeping force are killed, there would be outrage in the home country of the peacekeeping force, and the peace keeping force would be withdrawn - leaving civilians vulnerable; 7) It helps to be a citizen of the US - the US government always makes provisions for the evacuation of US citizens when a conflict occurs in any region in the world; 8) In times of great upheavals trust no one, and; 9) When the rule of law breaks down, and violent conflict occurs, it does not pay to be a law abiding citizen -  obedience will mean a certain death. 

[5] A lot of theories were propounded to explain the Twa people's very short stature and they can be abbreviated as follows:

• There are low ultraviolet levels in the rain forest  i.e., where the Twa lived. Owing to this, the Twa synthesized few fats into vitamin D, which fosters the uptake of calcium. Thus, this deficit of calcium is largely responsible for their small skeletal size.
• Their small stature is an adaptation that allows them to move quickly through dense forests, subsist on a very low calorie diet (rain forests have got a scarcity of food) and thrive in hot humid conditions.
• High mortality rates caused their central nervous systems to prioritize reproduction over growth. Hence their small stature.

A common thread runs through all these theories: the rain forest conditions contributed to the Twa's small stature. They are built like other peoples who live in similar latitudes (i.e. along the equator) across the globe (e.g. in Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Andaman Islands, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Brazil.). 
[6] Postscript 17 April 2014: For the sake of balance, I felt that it was prudent to notify you of the existence of competing narratives: Prior to her death, Allison Des Forges revised her official narrative to incorporate abuses that were committed by the Kagame-led army. Further, for an alternate version of what happened in Rwanda, see this resource. It was prepared by Professors Allan Stam and Christian Davenport. Furthermore, in a paper titled "Let's Be Friends" Luc Reydam uses declassified US government documents to construct an alternate narrative of the events that transpired in Rwanda. Another resource of interest is Rwanda: L'Histoire Secrète by Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza.